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THE DEMOCRATIC ASPECTS OF TRADE UNION
RECOGNITION, by Alan Bogg'
ANTHONY FORSYTH 2
IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO SEE why Alan Bogg's book, The Democratic Aspects of
Trade Union Recognition, won the 2010 Peter Birks Prize for Outstanding Legal
Scholarship (awarded by the British Society of Legal Scholars). Bogg has written a
highly engaging account of the origins, political foundations, and operative law
of collective bargaining in Britain, particularly in relation to the contested terrain
of trade union recognition for bargaining purposes.
The book skilfully combines perspectives drawn from political theory, legal
and policy analysis, and comparative labour law. It is the last of these-namely,
the book's contribution to international debates about the effectiveness of statutory
collective bargaining systems-that I wish to focus on in this review. This
dimension of Bogg's work will appeal especially to North American readers, as
his study of British law is rich with Canadian and American comparisons.
Bogg's primary focus is on the statutory trade union recognition procedure
introduced in 1999 by Tony Blair's "New Labour" government.' The Schedule
Al recognition procedure and its predecessors are portrayed as departures from
the British tradition of collective laissez-faire in employment relations. This
approach of minimal or indirect state support for collective bargaining-
immortalised in the work of Otto Kahn-Freund-is Bogg's preoccupation in
chapters one and two. He discusses and analyzes the challenges to collective
laissez-faire, including the various experiments in "direct methods of auxiliary
1. (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 303 pages.
2. Associate Professor, Faculty of Business and Economics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.
3. Employment Relations Act 1999 (U.K.), 1999, c. 26, Sch. Al of the Trade Union and Labour
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (U.K.), 1992, c. 52 [Schedule Al ].
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intervention" in collective bargaining in the 1970s.' These historical reflectionss
pave the way for an in-depth evaluation of the Schedule Al procedure in chapters
five to seven, making up the last third of the book. Throughout the book, Bogg
anchors his examination of the British collective bargaining framework to an
evolving discussion and critique of liberal, neo-liberal, and civic republican
discourses and their influence over British labour law.'
These political frames of reference enable Bogg to depict Britain's statutory
recognition procedure as "a kind of cultural marketplace for unions," whereby
"[b]argaining rights are allocated on the basis of workers' majority preferences,
either through membership evidence or ballot procedures."' However, he argues
that a democratic process like this can only be legitimate if both unions and
employers have "equality of opportunity to compete" for workers' allegiances.'
Bogg then demonstrates the many ways in which Schedule Al fails, in practice,
to live up to this ideal.
As an example, he shows how the British legislation does not adequately
address the problem of employers engaging in unfair practices with the inten-
tion of dissuading employees from voting in support of union recognition.
This is the case even after amendments to the ballot procedure in 2004' have
left open "the prospect that employers can still subvert worker free choice in
many cases," thereby undermining Schedule Al's "liberal objective of a level
playing field.""0
4. Supra note 1 at 37-38. This includes the first two attempts by Conservative and Labour
governments, respectively, to introduce a statutory recognition procedure in Britain. Industrial
Relations Act 1971 (U.K.), 1971, reprinted in Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974
(U.K.), 1974, c. 52; Employment Protection Act 1975 (U.K.), 1975, c. 71.
5. Other reviews of Bogg's book by British academics do these sections greater justice than I have
done here. See Ruth Dukes, Book Review of The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition
by Alan Bogg, (2010) 73 Mod. L. Rev. 691; Keith Ewing, Book Review of The Democratic
Aspects of Trade Union Recognition by Alan Bogg, (2010) 69 Cambridge L.J. 411.
6. For further discussion of these aspects of the book, see reviews cited ibid.; Sian Moore, Book
Review of The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition by Alan Bogg, (2010) 39 Indus.
L.J. 95.
7. Supra note 1 at 159. The "cultural marketplace" concept, derived from the work of Will
Kymlicka, is explored further by Bogg at 93-101.
8. Ibid. at 159.
9. Employment Relations Act 2004 (U.K), 2004, c. 24.
10. Supra note 1 at 186.
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Bogg examines the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) decisions regard-
ing unfair practice complaints brought by unions and the Committee's supervi-
sory role over the recognition ballot process. This analysis highlights that the
wording of the statutory provisions, combined with the CAC's conservative
approach to their interpretation, has allowed employers to counter union rec-
ognition campaigns through tactics such as "captive audience" speeches to the
workforce, inducements to remain non-unionised, the dissemination of robust
campaign material, and the use of anti-union consultants." In contrast, Bogg
finds that the CAC has adopted more constructive positions on certain issues,
such as allowing union recognition claims without a ballot where the union can
show majority membership in a bargaining unit, 12 deciding when union mem-
bership can be equated with employee support for recognition/collective bar-
gaining," and determining the relevant bargaining unit.'4
Bogg also exposes the British legislation's limitations in failing to provide,
as between employers and unions, "parity of access" to employees for commu-
nication purposes during recognition campaigns."s A government "code of prac-
tice" facilitates limited union organizational access during the ballot period, but
in the crucial build-up phase prior to the ballot, the common law protections of
employers' property rights (barring union access) remain intact." Even so, the
CAC has facilitated access once the ballot has begun-for example, by allowing
employees to attend union meetings during working time on full pay-to a
much greater extent than the US system that is premised on "the sanctity of
private property.""
This finding partly informs Bogg's conclusion that, "[o]verall, Schedule Al
approximates more closely to the liberal ideal of a fair cultural marketplace than
the US legal procedure" for union recognition.' 8 He identifies some of the US
model's other deficiencies, including the prevalence of "spiralling employer unfair
11. Ibid. at 166-73.
12. Ibid. at 175-86.
13. Ibid. at 210-12.
14. Ibid. at 239-44.
15. Ibid. at 193.
16. Ibid at 193-96.
17. Ibid. at 186-93.
18. Ibid. at 160.
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practices that the law is ill-equipped to stem"" and the enshrinement of a pas-
sive rather than "active" duty to bargain once recognition is secured. The latter
enables employers to engage in "surface bargaining" and other strategies to avoid
the making of a collective agreement. 20
For Bogg, the Canadian system is preferable as it possesses certain signifi-
cant design differences that provide unions with greater success than their US
counterparts in invoking statutory recognition rights. For example, Canadian
law minimizes the opportunity for employer influence both by accepting union
membership cards as evidence of majority support for recognition and by expe-
diting ballots (where they are required) through strict time limits. Thus, Can-
ada's "reconstructive" statutory design overcomes the chief flaws of the US
"regulatory" model-"legal delay and employer hostility." 21 And while in Britain
"Schedule Al has integrated many of the best features of the Canadian legal
model," according to Bogg this "should not breed complacency. Schedule Al
still falls short of parity in significant ways, and these regulatory failings require
urgent reform if the liberal aspiration is to be realised fully." 22
It should not be thought, based on the above, that Bogg is capable only of
identifying problems. His book is long on solutions as well, with various civic
strategies and reform strategies set out in chapters six and seven. These include
the idea of a "staged" approach to affording recognition rights, whereby a union
would obtain recognition for certain purposes where it has, say, only 10-20 per
cent support among the workforce (with full recognition flowing for bargaining
purposes once greater levels of support are achieved). 23 Bogg also calls for an
expansion of the required scope of bargaining under Schedule Al beyond "pay,
hours and holidays"; a broader obligation upon employers to disclose information
relevant to bargaining negotiations; a shift from "single employer bargaining" to
"a multi-level approach to industrial governance" (that is, sectoral or industry-
level bargaining); and a liberalizing of restrictions on strike action.21 However,
these proposals are unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future, as the
prospects of this occurring were already minimal under Gordon Brown's Labour
19. Ibid. at 175. See also 161-64.
20. Ibid at 257-69.
21. Ibid. at 175-76, 203.
22. Ibid at 160. See also 186, 204-05.
23. Ibid. at 227-35.
24. Ibid. at 282-87.
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government. Given the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition
government since the book's publication, any labour law reforms pursued in
Britain will almost certainly head in the opposite direction.25
While reading Bogg's comparative account of British and North American
collective bargaining law, I was struck by the degree of commonality of issues
confronting policymakers, unions, employers, courts, and tribunals in many
industrialized countries. These parallels can now be seen in Australia as well,
where a statutory duty to bargain in good faith was recently introduced. This
duty, however, is not based on a union recognition process but rather on the
establishment of "majority employee support" for collective bargaining.26 Already,
after almost two years of this new law's operation, we have seen the emergence
of some US-style tactics to counter union organizing campaigns. However, the
Australian legislation does not rely exclusively on employee ballots to establish
bargaining rights, and the federal industrial tribunal's interpretation of "good
faith" has limited some, but not all, unfair practices by employers.27 Those de-
signing Australia's new collective bargaining framework appear to have avoided
some of the features identified by Bogg that bedevil similar systems overseas.
My only criticism of Alan Bogg's fine book is that, for the non-British
reader, the explanation of the requirements that a union must satisfy in order to
gain Schedule Al recognition is somewhat disjointed. For example, we are only
told in passing about the admissibility thresholds for a recognition application
on pages 100 and 196, with some further treatment on page 209. Additionally,
part three of the book would have been well-served by a preliminary chapter
outlining the key elements of the Schedule Al process, the timeline that a
recognition application typically follows, and the alternative route of "voluntary
recognition."2 This would have been more effective than leaping straight into
25. See e.g. Alan Jones, "Unions Fear 'War' with Government over Strikes" The Independent (5 July
2010), online: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/unions-fear-war-with-
government-over-strikes-2018668.html>; Hil&ne Mulholland, "Government Accused of Declar-
ing War on Unions over Strike Law and Redundancy Plans" The Guardian (5 July 2010), online:
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jul/05/government-war-unions-strike-redundancy>.
26. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth.), Part 2-4.
27. See further Anthony Forsyth, "The Impact of 'Good Faith' Obligations on Collective
Bargaining Practices and Outcomes in Australia, Canada and the United States" C.L.E.L.J.
[forthcoming in 2011].
28. For a discussion of the use and limitations of the voluntary recognition process, see supra
note 1 at 147, 151-54, 223-27, 272-77.
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a discussion of the problem of unfair practices and the desirability of ensuring
equal campaign opportunities.
On a recent trip to the United Kingdom, I came across a newspaper report
about "a 'bitter struggle' for [union] recognition" that had been taking place for
a year at Cranberry Foods in Derby. According to the report, the employer had
recently engaged The Burke Group, a US-based labour relations consulting
firm that specialises in "'union avoidance' strategies."29 Some employees claimed
to' have been "warned by supervisors that the company could go bankrupt if the
union won recognition."30 The workers' experience at Cranberry Foods is yet
another illustration of the shortcomings-so convincingly articulated in Bogg's
book-of Britain's statutory union recognition procedure as an expression of the
liberal. promise of workplace democracy.
29. Matthew Taylor, "'Union-busting' Company Employed by Turkey Plant before Recognition
Vote" The Guardian (8 September 20i0), online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/
2010/sep/08/union-busting-company-employed>.
30. Ibid.
